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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
According to international airworthiness regulations, 
TURBOMECA has to demonstrate to authorities that 
its products (turboshaft engines) satisfy several 
safety requirements. Aeronautical standards propose 
practices widely accepted in order to demonstrate 
that a system is safe. In particular, ARP4754 (SAE 
1996a) provides guidelines about processes that can 
support the safety assessment of complex systems. 
ARP4761 (SAE 1996b) recommends methods to as-
sess the safety of a system such as Failure Modes 
and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Fault Tree Analy-
sis (FTA). This kind of analysis is performed to 
identify the scenarios leading to undesired events 
and to calculate the occurrence probability of unde-
sired events.  
However, if these analyses are still widely used in 
the industry, they have difficulties to take into ac-
count the constraints inherent to new industrial sys-
tems. First, the size and the complexity of current 
industrial systems increase. Moreover, they become 
more and more reconfigurable. Hence performing 
current safety analysis to identify all failure scenar-
ios becomes heavy to manage. Moreover, today, 
there is a gap between system analysis and safety 
analysis. So, a communication link is needed to 
share safety information with system engineers. 
By overcoming these limitations, we believe that 
we can significantly improve the efficiency of safety 
analyses. Thus, several works propose to base the 
system safety assessment on formal models of sys-
tem and dedicated tools for simulation, automatic 
generation of fault trees or automated search of fault 
scenarios leading to undesired events (see for in-
stance (Bouissou et al. 1991),  (Papadopoulos & Ma-
ruhn 2001),  (Bieber et al. 2004),  (Bozzano et al. 
2003),  (Joshi et al. 2003)).  
Amongst all candidate formal languages and 
tools, we choose to use AltaRica (Arnold et al. 2000) 
which was initially designed to ease the modelling 
and the analysis of system dependability. Previous 
works shown that AltaRica can be used to model 
various kinds of models (e.g. hydraulic and electrical 
systems (Bieber et al. 2004) or computer based sys-
tems (Humbert et al. 2008b),  (Bieber et al. 2008)). 
This article aims at generalizing the use of the Al-
taRica language to support the fault propagation 
modelling in physical systems. We present an Al-
taRica modelling methodology for multi-physical 
systems and we focus on two main physical do-
mains: mechanical and hydro-mechanical ones. 
From both the state of the art and our experience, we 
give some best practices to help modelling activities. 
For it, the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 
describes the system of interest considered in the pa-
per. Section 3 presents an overview of the classical 
safety analysis process. The AltaRica language is in-
troduced in section 4. In section 5, we expose our 
AltaRica modelling methodology. In section 6, 7 and 
8, we apply the methodology to the different sub-
systems of our case study. Last section presents a 
conclusion of our work.  
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ABSTRACT: Numerous works deal with the use of the formal language AltaRica to improve the safety as-
sessment process of industrial systems. In this context, the paper aims at describing and applying a common 
methodology to model physical systems. The example of a mechanical system and a hydro-mechanical system 
will be taken. 
 
2 SYSTEM OF INTEREST 
In order to be clear and readable, the presented sys-
tem is inspired from the real system but is drastically 
simplified. In this section, we introduce our case 
study and the considered failure conditions. 
During the flight, the turboshaft engine can possi-
bly be subjected to an overspeed, i.e. the speed of the 
engine is over than the normal one. This overspeed 
can be due to several reasons: mechanical (shaft 
breakdown), hydro-mechanical (too much fuel), 
software (bad setting) or operational (pilot action). In 
every case, the overspeed has to be mitigated.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 : Case study 
2.1 Description 
Considering the Figure 1, three sub-systems are par-
ticularly interesting to cover multi-physics model-
ling: the mechanical sub-system {Mechanical trans-
mission}, the fuel circuit and the controller. The 
combustion chamber is present only for the global 
comprehension of the system.  
The first sub-system {Mechanical transmission} 
is composed of several mechanical components such 
as turbines, mechanical gears, bearings… The main 
function of the system is to transform gas (from 
combustion chamber) into mechanical torque. This 
torque is then transmitted to the helicopter rotor. 
Moreover, two sensors transmit the speed of the tur-
bine to the controller. 
The controller controls the fuel flow with several 
parameters measured on the engine, and monitors 
the engine behaviour. In particular, if an overspeed is 
detected, it shuts off the fuel arrival (the controller 
activates a shut off valve in the fuel circuit). 
The fuel circuit ensures the fuel supply, metering 
and distribution to several injectors. Concerning our 
case study, the fuel circuit contains the shut off valve 
activated by the controller. If this valve is opened, 
the fuel returns to the tank and the engine will shut 
down.  
2.2 Failure conditions 
On the above case study, we are interested in two 
particular failure conditions: 
− An untimely in flight shut down of the engine; 
− An overspeed of the engine. 
3 CLASSICAL SAFETY PROCESS 
3.1 Definition 
Before describing the classical safety analyses, some 
definitions, strongly inspired from (SAE 1996a), are 
introduced.  
− Failure: the inability of an item to perform its in-
tended function.  
− Failure condition: Condition with an effect on the 
system and its users, caused by one or several 
failures. It depends on both operational and envi-
ronmental conditions. 
− Failure mode: the way in which the failure of an 
item occurs. 
3.2 Classical safety analyses 
Safety engineering ensures that the safety require-
ments (extracted from international standards, heli-
copter manufacturer specification…) are satisfied by 
the system considering all potential failure modes of 
each component. In this purpose, safety studies aim 
at defining the safety requirements for each system 
and then ensure that the system fulfils its required 
properties. In aeronautical practice, we can distin-
guish the following types of safety requirements. 
− Assessment of qualitative requirements. The ob-
jective is to demonstrate that no combination of 
events with less than N individual failures leads 
to the failure condition (N depends on the severity 
of the failure condition).  
− Assessment of quantitative requirements. The ob-
jective is to compute the occurrence probability of 
failure condition.  
 
To perform the safety analyses, safety engineers tra-
ditionally use the Failure Modes and Effects Analy-
sis (FMEA) and the Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) 
 (Villemeur 1992).  
Building a FMEA consists in identifying all the 
potential failure modes of each system component 
and analysing their local and global effects on the 
system.  
A FTA is a top down approach which illustrates 
the way in which low level component failures con-
tribute to the global system failure condition. Thus, 
an FTA begins with a defined failure condition and 
breaks it down progressively into a boolean combi-
nations of basic failure modes identified in the 
FMEA. The resulting set of boolean equations can 
be used to compute both the occurrence probability 
of the top level failure condition and the minimal 
sets of events leading to this failure condition. 
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3.3 Toward model based safety assessment 
Although FMEA and FTA are classical methods, 
several limits can be seen. 
− The size and the complexity of current industrial 
systems grow. They become highly reconfigur-
able and performing the identification of failure 
scenarios without model can be error prone; 
− Because a fault tree describes only one failure 
condition, it can be heavy to build all fault trees 
for all failure conditions; 
− Even if the formalism of fault trees allows an easy 
computation of qualitative and quantitative re-
sults, this formalism is different from the repre-
sentation of the system. The fault trees can be dif-
ficult to read for someone outside the safety 
domain, especially when the number of elemen-
tary events is important.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 : The two approaches 
 
We think these limits can be overcome by perform-
ing the safety analysis activities on formal model of 
the system under development. Instead of building 
one fault tree for each failure condition, we provide 
a formal model describing both the nominal behav-
iour and the dysfunctional behaviour of the system. 
On this model, several failure conditions can be 
studied. The failure scenarios as well as the FTA 
could be automatically generated. 
4 ALTARICA 
Amongst all the languages available in the literature 
to perform MBSA, we have chosen to use AltaRica, 
a formal modelling language, developed at LaBRI to 
describe both functional and dysfunctional behaviour 
of a system  (Arnold et al. 2000). Moreover, the lan-
guage is carried out by several tools. We use the tool 
Cecilia™ OCAS from Dassault Aviation to edit 
graphically the model then to analyse it by several 
means: simulation, automatic generation of minimal 
cuts (i.e. the shortest scenarios leading to the failure 
condition) or sequences (i.e. ordered cuts). 
An AltaRica model is a network of intercon-
nected components so called “nodes”. A node is 
atomic or composed of interconnected sub-nodes.  
Each node has a finite number of: 
- flow variables. They are the inputs and the 
outputs of the node used to link the node and 
its environment (other nodes).  
- state variables. These internal variables 
memorize current or previous functioning 
mode (for example, failure mode). In our 
models, these variables (flow and state) be-
long to finite domains of values (Boolean or 
enumerated) 
- events. They label changes of the value of 
state variables. They model the occurrences 
of fault, human action or a reaction to a 
change of one input value. 
The node dynamic is defined by: 
- init. This is used to assign initial value to 
state variables 
- transitions. They describe how the state vari-
ables are modified. They have the following 
format: “G(s,v) |- E ->s_”where G(s,v) is a 
Boolean condition on state variables s and 
input variables v, E is the event and s_ is the 
effect of the transition on state variables. If 
the condition G is true, then the event E can 
be triggered and state variables are modified 
as described in s_. 
- assertions. These equations describe how 
output variables are computed from inputs 
and state variables.  
 
These concepts are illustrated by the following ex-
ample.  
node Pipe 
//declaration of variables and events 
  flow 
input: bool: in;  
output: bool: out;  
  state 
ST = {ok, ko}; 
  event 
Leakage; 
//dynamic of the states 
  init 
ST:=ok;  
  trans 
ST=ok |- leakage -> ST:= ko; 
//function performed in each states 
  assert 
output = case { ST=ok : input,  
                 else false} ;  
edon 
 
This component has one input and one output vari-
ables both ranging over the Boolean domain {true, 
false}, one state variable ST ranging over the domain 
{ok, ko} and one event Leakage. At the initial in-
stant, the node is in state “ok”. The event Leakage 
describes a failure which leads the node into the state 
“ko”. “Leakage” can be triggered only if the node is 
in state “ok”. The assertion means that the output 
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value is equal to the input one if the node is in state 
“ok”. In other cases, the output value is “false”.  
5 INFORMATION NEEDED TO BUILD 
ALTARICA MODELS 
This section aims at identifying the information 
needed to build a set of AltaRica nodes relevant for 
the safety assessment of a detailed system design. In 
 (Humbert et al. 2008a), a process is proposed to 
identify the information useful to model computer 
based systems. We give here an overview of this ap-
proach that was generalized to deal with multi-
physics systems. Details will be given further for the 
application of the methodology to mechanical and 
hydro-mechanical domains. 
5.1 Model purpose and requested preliminary 
analysis 
The model perimeter shall fully cover the system 
under study and it shall enable the analysis of a set 
of failure conditions on this perimeter.  
To reach this goal, the model shall focus on the 
fault propagation inside the studied perimeter. The 
faults are propagated between components that are 
functionally or physically dependant. The fault can 
be detected and tolerated by specific mechanisms 
that shall occur inside the model.  
Finally, the failure condition shall be observable 
inside the model.  
So before starting the modelling activity, three 
main kinds of data shall be specified: 
− perimeter and structure of the system; 
− expression of the failure conditions in relation-
ship with the model perimeter;  
− propagation laws inside each atomic components 
that results both from functions performed in the 
nominal case and from potential faults and ob-
servable failure modes. 
 
First, we propose to carry on the following prelimi-
nary analysis steps: 
− functional analysis of the system and the sub-
systems; 
− decomposition of the global system into sub-
systems; 
− identification of the interfaces between these sub-
systems; 
− identification of the system failure conditions and 
associated requirements; 
− declination of system failure conditions (and their 
requirements) to sub-systems; 
− in each sub-system, identification of components 
which have an impact on the failure conditions; 
− in each sub-system, identification of the interfaces 
between these components; 
− identification of potential component faults and 
failure modes. 
 
Let us now clarify how the results of this preliminary 
analysis are used to specify the needed data. 
5.2 Characterization of the model overall structure 
  
When an AltaRica model is built to assess a detailed 
system design, the choice and the granularity of the 
AltaRica nodes used to cover the system perimeter 
depend first on pre-existing design choice. When the 
system was decomposed into sub-systems and com-
ponents, the model structure will reflect as much as 
possible the predefined structure of the system. 
When the structure does not present any hierarchy, it 
is interesting to identify sub-systems made of groups 
of physically homogeneous components: as we will 
see in the next sections, the fault propagation inside 
components of a same physical domain can generally 
be achieved by a set of homogeneous physical pa-
rameters. 
This granularity can be refined accordingly to the 
functional analysis to make explicit functions inte-
grated into organic components. In particular, fault 
detection, isolation and recovery mechanisms shall 
be identified and handled in some nodes. 
Conversely, a set of organic or functional compo-
nents may be removed or grouped into one equiva-
lent node for sake of efficiency. This is particularly 
meaningful when the abstracted components do not 
impact the studied failure conditions. The soundness 
of such a choice can be justified either by the func-
tional analysis or by the failure mode analysis. 
 
Then, for each identified nodes, the choice of input-
output flows shall reflect physical or functional 
points of dependency between the node and its envi-
ronment. It is worth noting that, if the concept of in-
put/output oriented flows corresponds to a physical 
reality for computer based systems, it is less natural 
for electrical, hydro-mechanical or mechanic system. 
In these last cases, the functional analysis helps to 
identify the physical parameters handled by the 
nodes as we will see in section  7. 
5.3 Characterization of observable failure 
condition 
As written in section  5.1, the studied failure condi-
tions shall be observable inside the model. For this 
purpose, we begin by expressing the global system 
failure condition in relationship with the model pe-
rimeter (i.e. declining the system failure condition to 
the sub-system). Then, the choice of input-output 
flows and theirs granularities (i.e. their definition 
domains) shall allow the depiction and the observa-
tion of these failure conditions.  
Practically and to perform this observation, spe-
cial nodes (called observer) are defined in the Al-
taRica model. 
5.4 Characterization of an atomic node 
Once the model overall structure and the failure 
condition to observe defined, we shall model the 
propagation laws in each identified node of the 
model. For this purpose, we first refined the high 
level input-output (I/O) flows (defined in section 
 5.2) into concrete flows. For it, we use 1) the func-
tional analysis of the component, 2) the FMEA and 
3) the failure conditions to observe (i.e. the objec-
tives of the model). Although the choice of these 
flows remains highly subjective some recommenda-
tions shall be made:  
- choosing physical greatnesses to refined high 
level I/O flows allow the propagation of in-
formation in the model; 
- depending on the goal of the model, we can 
propagate by I/O flows the value of a great-
ness (nominal, low,…) or its quality (correct 
/ erroneous);   
- I/O flows could be unidirectional or bidirec-
tional (in several physical domains, a fault 
has consequences on components located 
both downward and upward). 
 
Once the I/O concrete flows identified, we are inter-
ested in the different events to take in account in the 
model. For it, we shall identify, for each component, 
the functions performed in the nominal case, its po-
tential failure modes and the failure propagation in-
side the component.  
Practically, the functions performed in the nomi-
nal case are identified thanks to the functional analy-
sis and available design documents.  
Concerning the potential failure modes to model, 
they are derived from both the functional analysis 
and the FMEA. The second one (used to describe the 
internal and organic failure modes of the component) 
is too detailed: for a given component, two different 
failure modes can lead to the same functional effect). 
So, the first one allows the identification of high 
level failure modes. Then, the AltaRica model will 
embed, as much as possible, these high level failure 
modes; each of these ones corresponding to one ore 
more organic failure mode described in the FMEA. 
From another point of view, if two (or more) events 
of the FMEA have the same effect on the compo-
nent, we can model them as one unique AltaRica 
event (of course, the probability of this resulting 
event has to be computed from the probability of the 
two initial events). 
Concerning the fault propagation inside the com-
ponent, we have to identify a set of failure modes 
which can be propagated to the input of the compo-
nent. 
The previous steps allow the identification of I/O 
flows and events to propagate by and through the 
components. Now, we shall identify the definition 
domain of these I/O flows. According to us, an ade-
quate solution is to choose these definition domains 
in order to model the necessary and sufficient infor-
mation to both propagate the identified events and 
observe the considered failure conditions. 
 
At this stage, we have defined the static parts of the 
node, i.e. the flow and state variables, the events. 
Here, we want to define the dynamic of the AltaRica 
node, i.e. the transitions. To achieve this goal, two 
main kinds of data shall be specified. 
The first one is the trigger mechanism of each identi-
fied events, i.e. the condition under which an event 
can be triggered (for example, an event can be trig-
ger only if the component is in a specific state). On 
AltaRica model, this step leads to the definition of 
the transition guards and allow, among other things, 
to model faults in domino effect.  
Secondly, for each identified event, we have to 
identify if this event is permanent or transient (for 
example, to model transient failure). In case of tran-
sient event, we add to the model a “reverse event” 
and a transient state. The associated transitions will 
be described such as  
 
// Transitions associated with transient event 
ST=ok |- Transient_event -> ST:= transient; 
// Transitions associated with reverse event   
ST:= transient |- Reverse_event -> ST:=ok; 
 
We have now to model the AltaRica assertions. Such 
assertions will be defined as decision tables: each 
output is defined depending on the value of the state 
variables (the current state of the node) and the value 
of the input flow variables.  
- 
Thus, this methodology aims at abstracting system-
atically details of physics so that the formal safety 
models provide information at meaningful granular-
ity level for safety experts. The following sections 
aim at applying the methodology for the case study. 
In this purpose, the section 6 develops the prelimi-
nary analysis of the global system. Then, the method 
is applied to mechanical system in section  7. Results 
for hydro-mechanical and computer-based systems 
are described in section  8 and  9.     
6 PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF THE CASE 
STUDY 
6.1 Model overall structure 
According to Figure 1, the global system can be de-
composed into three systems of interest:  
− A mechanical system: the mechanical transmis-
sion from turbines to the helicopter rotor; 
− A hydro-mechanical system: the fuel circuit of the 
engine; 
− A control system which adapts the engine to the 
helicopter power requirements whilst remaining 
within defined limits.  
 
About the interfaces between these three sub-
systems, they are depicted on Figure 1:  
− The mechanical system speed measure is trans-
mitted to the control system by sensors;  
− The control system transmits to the fuel circuit 1) 
the fuel quantity setting, 2) the command for the 
fuel shut off valve;  
− The fuel circuit transmits the fuel to the combus-
tion chamber (i.e. to the mechanical system).  
6.2 Declining failure conditions to sub-systems 
Let us remind that studied high level failure condi-
tions are 1) the In Flight Shut Down (IFSD) of the 
engine and 2) an overspeed of the engine. In the fol-
lowing table, we call them FC1 and FC2 and we de-
cline them to the three sub-systems of interest.  
 
Table 1.   Failure conditions declined to sub-systems 
 FC1 FC2 
Mechanical 
system 
Loss of the trans-
mission 
Overspeed of the 
transmission 
Hydro-
mechanical 
system 
No more fuel is 
injected in the en-
gine 
Too much fuel is 
injected in the en-
gine 
Control 
system 
The fuel quantity 
setting is set to 
idle  
The fuel quantity 
setting is set to 
the maximum 
value 
7 APPLICATION TO MECHANICAL SYSTEM 
7.1 Preliminary analysis: architecture of the 
mechanical sub-system 
To identify the components which have an impact on 
the considered failure conditions, we use the failure 
analysis (the FMEA). Thus, components with an im-
pact of the studied failure conditions will be mod-
elled; components without impact on considered 
failure conditions will not be modelled; components 
without effect on the safety of the system will not be 
modelled.   
We identify the architecture of the mechanical 
sub-system. Without details, this system is typically 
composed by mechanical gears, bearings, shafts, 
screws…  
Then, we use the design documents to identify the 
functional interfaces between the different compo-
nents. Thus, we construct a first architecture of the 
sub-system. 
 
From this point, we suppose that 1) we have a list of 
components to model and 2) we know the objectives 
of the model, i.e. the list of failure conditions to ob-
serve on the model (Cf. Table 1). 
In this section, we consider the example of a me-
chanical shaft. This shaft is a simple rotating shaft 
which transmits power from an input point to an 
output point.  
7.2 High level input-output flows 
To identify high level input-output (I/O) flows, we 
perform a functional analysis (Figure 3) of the com-
ponent (the shaft). In this analysis, we identify all 
functional inputs and outputs, i.e. all functional in-
terfaces between the component and its environment.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 : Functional analysis of the shaft 
 
These high level I/O flows are refined in the further 
steps of the method. In the paper, we are mainly in-
terested in the input and output power.  
7.3 Characterization of the behaviour 
In this section, we identify 1) the AltaRica events; 2) 
the AltaRica transitions; 3) the level of details of I/O 
flows variables.  
As already explained in section  5.4, events (func-
tional and dysfunctional) are identified from the 
functional analysis and from the FMEA. Without de-
tails, the considered events are here the breakdown 
of the shaft and the emission of metallic particles.  
Once these events identified, we can picture the 
functional and dysfunctional states of the compo-
nent. Here, there is one functional state (transmis-
sion ok and no emission of particles) and three dys-
functional states ({transmission ko, no particles}; 
{transmission ok, particles emitted}; {transmission 
ko, particles emitted}).  
By combining the events and these states, we can 
describe the transitions between these states.  
 
To refine the high level I/O flows (input and output 
power), we are interested in fault propagations in the 
model. The model of the shaft shall propagate both 
its own events (breakdown) and the event of its envi-
ronment (other components). For it, we identify pos-
sible events in the system which can have an effect 
on the input of the component. Here, we identify one 
event: a breakdown of the transmission between the 
Oil 
Input power Output power 
Used oil 
Guidance 
Transmitting 
the power 
engine and the helicopter. Considering the FMEA, 
the described failures have effects on 1) the torque 
transmitted and 2) the rotation speed of the mechani-
cal component. A failure can affect the torque, the 
speed or the two. So, we choose to propagate the 
couple {torque, speed}. 
Moreover and because a mechanical system is a 
continuous system, a fault of the shaft has conse-
quences on components located downward and also 
upward. So, the propagation of the couple {torque, 
speed} has to be bidirectional.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4 : Input / output variables for the propagation of fail-
ures in a mechanical sub-system 
 
About the “Oil” and “Used Oil”, we propagate in the 
mechanical model two variables: 1) the presence or 
the absence of oil and 2) the presence or the absence 
of particles in the oil. Both of these variables are 
Booleans. The propagation is unidirectional (up-
stream to downstream). 
About the guidance of the shaft, we propagate the 
correct realization (or not) of the function. So, the 
guidance is modelled with a unique Boolean vari-
able. The propagation is unidirectional (upstream to 
downstream). 
 
Now, we have to identify the level of details of these 
variables. About this level of details and according 
to us, an adequate solution is to propagate the neces-
sary and sufficient information to achieve the objec-
tives of the model. Here, the failure modes to propa-
gate are breakdowns. Also, we have to propagate the 
overspeed in the system. So, because we want here 
observe the loss and the overspeed of the transmis-
sion, we choose as level of detail:  
− {ok, null, too high} for the torque variable; 
− {ok, null, overspeed} for the speed variable. 
 
Table 2.   Modelling of a breakdown 
Outputs Value 
Torque to upstream Null 
Speed to upstream Null 
Torque to downstream Null 
Speed to downstream Null 
8 RESULTS FOR HYDRO-MECHANICAL 
SYSTEM 
In this section, we present the crucial information 
about the modelling of a hydro-mechanical system.  
Architecture of hydro-mechanical system. Typically, 
such a system is composed with several pumps 
(move fluid and create pressure), filters (protect sys-
tem by retaining particles), valves (supply fluid un-
der conditions) or pipes (supply fluid).  
 
Events. Typically, events are leakage or clogging of 
the component. Several level of severity could be 
considered for these events. 
 
I/O flows. To propagate these events and observing 
the failure conditions (section  6.2), we propagate the 
couple {fluid flow, fluid pressure} in the model. The 
propagation is bidirectional. For these variables, we 
choose as level of detail:  
− {ok, no, too high} for the fluid flow variable; 
− {ok, no, overpressure} for the  fluid pressure vari-
able. 
Other variables are also considered such as the 
temperature of the fuel (Boolean: normal or too hot), 
the presence of particles in the fuel (Boolean), the 
behaviour of the flow (Enumerated: normal, stucked 
constant, oscillation). All of these variables are uni-
directional (propagated to downstream components). 
9 SOFTWARE MODELLING 
In this section, we present the crucial information 
about the modelling of a computer based system. 
 
Architecture of computer based system. A computer 
based system relates to the digital components of a 
system.  
 
Events. (Bieber et al. 2004) define three essential 
failure modes: loss, untimely delivery and erroneous 
operation of function. 
 
I/O flows. This kind of system differs in several 
ways from other physical systems already intro-
duced. If the thread of the method remains constant, 
the study is stopped to the functional level and 
propagation information are generally limited to the 
quality of the realized functions. Moreover, digital 
components have well identified inputs and outputs. 
Thus, a failure of a component will have direct con-
sequences only on components which use specifi-
cally the result of the function. Thus, we only have 
to propagate the failure (i.e. if the signal is reliable, 
erroneous or lost) to other components which are 
functionally downstream the component under study.  
10 CONCLUSION 
This paper presents research works that has been car-
ried out in the aeronautic field to enhance the safety 
assessment of physical systems. A common method-
ology can be used to help the formalization of the 
failure propagation inside systems made of various 
Torque from upstream 
Speed from upstream 
Torque to upstream 
Speed to upstream 
Torque to downstream 
Speed to downstream 
Torque from downstream 
Speed from downstream 
technologies (mechanical, hydro-mechanical or 
computer-based systems). The methodology aims at 
abstracting systematically details of physics so that 
the formal safety models provide information at 
meaningful granularity level for safety experts. 
Moreover, they enable tackling significant systems, 
without loosing completeness and soundness, with 
respect to the results provided by equivalent tradi-
tional safety analysis.  
Thus, this paper presents the application of the 
methodology for the AltaRica modelling of me-
chanical, hydro-mechanical and computer-based sys-
tems. Today, AltaRica approach becomes more and 
more operationally used in industry (For example, 
Dassault, Airbus, Turbomeca) and it highlights an-
other domain dependant successful use of formal 
methods. Nevertheless, some languages limits de-
serve to be considered. The observations of failure 
conditions and the propagation of failures need some 
modelling artefacts. For instance, bidirectional 
propagation is achieved by decomposing component 
interfaces into two variables: one input variable and 
one output variable. Also, it could be quite difficult 
to model interfaces without physical links between 
two components. In a more general way, it is diffi-
cult to model components where inputs and outputs 
are not well identified. The proposed methodology 
leads to tractable and accurate models. However, the 
model is not easy to validate.  
To follow this direction, further works deal cur-
rently with ways to integrate more and more rigor-
ously these formal models in the overall safety and 
design process. For instance, we are studying how to 
validate systematically a new library or a given 
model before using it for safety assessment.  
Another issue is more related to system engineer-
ing practices. Indeed, it may be hard to find a speci-
fication of the system behaviour at a good abstrac-
tion level. Accurate details can often be found in 
design documents but these details need to be ab-
stracted for the safety analysis purpose. We believe 
that the modelling task is easier if system formal 
specifications already exist. So, our work is on-going 
to define a formal specification of the system. This 
specification will be beginning of the AltaRica mod-
elling and a support for the validation of the model. 
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